Keys to Successful
Partnership Aerospace ProjectsBy:
Ivan M. Rosenberg1 Frontier Associates, Inc., Valley Village,
CA, 91607 and John Marriott2 Ball Aerospace &
Technologies Corp., Boulder, CO 80306
|
This paper reports on the lessons learned by project managers from numerous
aerospace projects that involved true partnering (vs. arms-length subcontracting)
between a NASA Center and a for-profit aerospace company, and will suggest specific
actions to do and not do that increase the chances for mission success.
|
Nomenclature
|
| TRL
= Technology Readiness Level |
I. Introduction3
|
MANY
aerospace projects involve multiple organizations as a result of a need to access
a diversity of expertise and disciplines and the desire of Congress to maximize
outsourcing to industry4. Projects that push or go beyond known technologies,
or that involve technologies rated below TRL 65, tend to require a
particularly close partnership6 between organizations, because requirements
and deliverables cannot be clearly specified in advance. This article reports
on the findings of a study exploring the success and failure factors of partnership-based
projects, as perceived by project managers who participated in them. In the
study participants' view, the success or failure of a mission almost never depends
on technological factors or engineering competence. Those who work on aerospace
projects almost always have been verified to have a high degree of engineering
competence. The participants believed, rather, that success and failure are almost
always a consequence of human factors such as how well the members of the participating
organizations communicated and worked together. (Many of the participants also
reported feeling surprised by this realization.). |
| One
participant visualized the human factor as a "relationship bank account."
The inevitable major problems and obstacles during development and flight can
be visualized as bank account withdrawals. If the withdrawals cause an "account
overdraft" a high degree of conflict between the organizations, accompanied
by a lowered probability of mission success, was likely. |
| The
study indicates that those engaged in partnership-based missions should: |
| 1) | Take
early actions that build the relationship bank account. |
| 2) | Act
to maintain the account at a sufficiently high level during the mission. |
| One study
does not constitute the definitive word on this topic. The results do, however,
suggest that follow-up work holds promise. And they open up a new approach to
improving the budget, schedule, and performance aspects of many aerospace projects.
|
II. The Study |
| The
Civil Space Division of Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp. (Ball) provides
total missions, spacecraft, subsystem, and components to NASA, typically contracting
through Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Ball and JPL were both interested in
determining the predominant success and failure factors for space missions in
which they needed to operate as a single, seamless organization. This type of
relationship contrasts with a more classic subcontractor-customer relationship,
in which a customer can completely specify a well-defined product in advance,
such as with an off-the-shelf component, and then not be involved until delivery.
|
| The
study involved 28 confidential one-on-one interviews with project managers and
executives at JPL and Ball, all of whom had participated in space projects involving
a partnership of the two organizations. Some of the missions also involved other
partnering organizations. |
III. Summary of Findings |
| The
following three points summarize the findings of the study: |
| 1) | Mutual
Respect: Despite interpersonal and organizational conflicts, participants
typically had high respect for the technical capability of the members of the
partner organizations and recognized their common love of space. |
| 2) | Impact
of Human Factors: People skills such as communication, building relationships,
working out conflicts, and operating as a team were seen as the dominant factors
in determining the success of a project. Almost all comments addressing the reasons
for mission success or failure dealt with people issues. Very few comments were
made about technical problems, and almost all of these were seen to have their
roots and/or solution in management or people relationships. As one interviewee
said, "No NASA mission in recent decades has failed because of engineering
or technical incompetence. It was always a people problem." |
| 3) | Impact
of Jargon and Process Disconnects: Differences in jargon and processes, such
as methods for problem solving, decision-making, testing, and delivery, have a
critical impact on the success of the project. For success, these disconnects
between partnering organizations must be resolved early in the project. |
IV.
Mutual Respect |
| A.
Findings |
| Regardless
of individual conflicts, two strong bonds between the members of JPL and Ball
tended to transcend individual conflicts: a high respect for each other's technical
capability and a (mostly unarticulated) common love of space. |
| B.
Implications of these Findings |
| | 1) | Relationships
between people in partnering organizations can be built on an existing strong
foundation of mutual respect for technical ability and a common love of space. |
| | 2) | Significant
improvements in aerospace project performance are unlikely to come from improving
engineering competence or increasing technical reviews. |
V. Impact of Human Factors |
| A.
Findings |
| People
skills such as communication, building relationships, working out conflicts, and
operating as a team were seen as the dominant factors in determining the success
of a project. The personal relationships between the project managers from each
of the partner organizations had the greatest impact on project success or failure.
|
| One
participant visualized the human factor between partnering organizations as a
"relationship bank account." Given the complexity and pressures of most
aerospace missions, he said, it was almost certain that a mission was going to
experience major problems and obstacles during development and flight, comparable
to bank account withdrawals. If the relationship bank account is too small when
withdrawals occur, an "account overdraft" results: a high degree of
conflict between the organizations, characterized by blaming and finger-pointing,
There are now two problems - the technical issue itself and a breakdown among
people working together. This combination significantly lowers the probability
of mission success. If the relationship account is sufficiently healthy when withdrawals
occur, the partnership can quickly solve the problem and recover, and the mission
is likely to be successful. |
| B.
Implications of these Findings |
| | 1) | Establish
Strong Relationships Early: To build a reserve that can be drawn upon when
the inevitable problems occur, establish strong personal and inter-organizational
relationships from the very beginning of a project. One highly successful partnership
spent the first six months primarily establishing how they were going to work
together and building relationships. |
| | Even
while working on technical problems, they used them as case studies of how to
work together. Here are some of the rules this partnership established: |
| | a. | Establish
and communicate each team member's guiding principles, for example mission success,
recognition, future business, and contractor fee. |
| | b. | No
complaints about a partner organization. Statements such as, "Those guys
at ABC are always late" are prohibited. You can talk only about specific
people and specific behavior. Generalizations that cause schisms between organizations
are ruled out. |
| | c. | In
most cases partner vendors are not required to inform the customer of a problem
for 24 hours, providing vendors time to analyze the situation and begin to think
of solutions. This prevents the customer from leaping to conclusions, assigning
blame, and intervening before giving time to the vendor for adequate investigation
and thought. Teams used the 24 hours to establish a go-forward plan that, in most
cases, included the vendor and customer in the solution. That put a deposit rather
than a withdrawal into the relationship bank account. |
| | d. | All
partners are invited to all project meetings except those that determine vendor
performance fees. This led to openness, peer relationships, and ownership that
generated proactive creative thought, particularly by the vendors. |
| | e. | Agree
in writing how various types of decisions are to be made. For example, a document
signed by all parties specified what decisions a vendor could make without informing
the customer and what decisions required the customer's prior approval. This clarified
the appropriate actions in thousands of cases and reduced almost to zero accusations
of acting in "bad faith," which undermine a partnership. |
| | 2) | Agree
on Management Baseline Upfront: In the upfront portion of the program, all
partners must define and agree on a clear baseline, including roles and responsibilities
and the decision-making processes, and agree how to manage that baseline. This
written agreement should also describe how changes to the baseline are to be recognized,
documented, and acted upon. |
| | 3) | Maintain
the Relationship: Continuously address the changes needed, for example in
decision-making, over the project life cycle. Relationships, like living organisms,
grow and change over time. Maintaining a good relationship needs to be an ongoing
topic of concern and needs to remain on the agenda for discussion and action.
|
| | 4) | Relationships
of trust are professional and personal. Many forms of communication and trust
building take place initially at the personal level. When people learn that they
can depend on one another in difficult times, the personal and professional tend
to overlap and reinforce each other. In a professional partnership, therefore,
expect team members to limit their trust to those with the same organizational
badges until trust in others develops. |
| | | For
example, on one project the JPL project manager (the customer) visited each partnering
vendor at least one day every month, whether there was a clear topic for discussion
or not. Going to the vendor was seen as a sign of respect, which enhanced the
relationship, and his actions communicated the importance of maintaining a good
relationship with the vendor. Furthermore, the JPL project manager saw things
and people during his visits that he would not have encountered at JPL meetings.
Even without a prior agenda, there was always something to talk about, and when
technical issues were not at the forefront, relationship topics often came up
that would otherwise have been written off as "not important." These
topics could have caused major problems had they been left to fester. |
| | | For
its part, Ball worked hard to make visiting JPL customers feel part of the team.
They were provided with 24-hour access badges, desk space, and full access to
computing facilities (particularly access to their JPL e-mail and printers). Enabling
team members from different organizations to overcome firewalls and other obstacles
and access each other's databases promoted efficient project monitoring - and
a strong relationship. |
| | 5) | The
Critical Nature of Communication: Clear, open, consistent, frequent, and high-quality
communication is critical to establishing and maintaining the personal relationships
that contribute to success. Partnerships benefit from monthly face-to-face meetings,
annual retreats, and opportunities for informal social interaction, among other
types of communication. Often, however, such "soft activities" are the
first to be cut when budgets tighten. This study indicates that such "economies"
are likely to lead to costly project setbacks. |
VI. Impact of Jargon and Process Disconnects |
| A.
Findings |
| Every
organization, even those within the same industry, develops unique jargon and
processes. These differences, if undistinguished and resolved, can cause relationship
problems and incompatibilities in technical design and implementation processes. |
| The study uncovered
major differences between JPL and Ball, stemming from these factors: |
| | 1) | JPL
is operated under contract to the government as part of a not-for-profit educational
institution7. Ball is a public for-profit corporation. Some within
JPL felt that it was somehow "immoral" to make a profit on the space
program, or illogical that one would lessen the chances of mission success by
allocating money to profit rather than to decreasing risk. |
| | 2) | Some
of Ball's jargon and processes derived from Earth-orbit missions. JPL's jargon
and processes are generally oriented to deep-space missions. For example, Ball
spoke of "commissioning," JPL of "characterization." |
| | 3) | JPL
and Ball use slightly different processes for solving problems, a relationship
disconnect which almost caused the failure of the Deep Impact mission. JPL first
asks, "Regardless of cost and schedule, what is the best way to solve this
problem?" Then, cost, schedule, and risk considerations are analyzed to make
the tradeoffs clear. Ball tends to include cost, schedule, and risk considerations
in the initial problem solution analysis. This difference led to significant conflicts
and misunderstandings until the varying approaches were uncovered, understood,
and resolved. |
| | 4) | The
life cycle stages of a project were considerably different. |
| | 5) | Even
a term as seemingly innocuous as "mission success" had subtle differences
of meaning that caused relationship schisms and subsequent mission problems. A
commitment to mission success is fundamental to both JPL and Ball. However, the
differences in definition caused each organization to suspect that the other was
not committed to mission success, and therefore was a danger to the mission. This
led to numerous personnel conflicts, additional work and costs stemming from a
lack of trust, and decisions that sometimes endangered the continuation of the
mission. |
| B.
Implications of these Findings |
| | 1) | Develop
dictionaries: It is useful for each partner to draw up a list of its typical
jargon words and phrases and their commonly understood meanings. Making a list
of the other organization's jargon is also useful, particularly because some jargon
is so deeply rooted in a corporate culture that only outsiders recognize it as
jargon. After drawing up their lists, the parties spend time determining equivalent
terms (sometimes subtle distinctions can be critical) and resolving what terms
will be primarily used. These "dictionaries" are then distributed, discussed,
and continuously updated. Updating is essential due to the problem of not knowing
what you don't know. It would have been impossible at the outset of the Deep Impact
partnership to uncover the disconnect concealed in the phrase, "mission success,"
but once discovered it was easily resolved. |
| | 2) | Uncover
Process Disconnects: A session in which each partner explains its processes,
starting with the project life cycle, can shed a great deal of light, particularly
if the participants listen for disconnects (versus listening for agree/disagree).
Critical processes also include requirements, specification, communication, documentation,
problem solving, decision-making, testing, reviews, integration, operation, management
style, and completion of contract. |
VII. Conclusion |
| To
create a highly performing team that can navigate through loosely defined, incomplete
requirements while uniting to achieve mission success on schedule and on budget
requires addressing the relationship between the partnering organizations. Building
common ground and establishing professional and personal relationships are high
priorities for success. Establish success criteria for the team that include all
partners. Find ways to track performance, communicate that performance, and show
appreciation for a job well done. Grade the personal and team relationships in
the same way you would grade a technical review. |
| Creating
this approach is simple when people see its value: excellent team performance
based on a unified approach to issue identification and resolution. Remember,
a common "love of space" drives these projects. The rest can be easily
coached. |
| ________ |
| 1President
& CEO, 4804 Laurel Canyon Blvd., Suite 804, Valley Village, CA 91607, AIAA
Professional Member. |
|
2Director of Flight Programs (Retired), 1600 Commerce Street, Boulder,
CO 80306. |
| 3The
views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and of the
individuals interviewed during the study, and not of the authors' organizations
or JPL. |
|
4While this article is based on a study of projects requiring cooperation
between groups from two different entities, we have found that many of the same
factors apply when success requires cooperation between groups within a single
organization. |
|
5TRL stands for Technology Readiness Level, a measure of how ready
a technology is for flight. The range is from technology in the conceptual stage
to having successfully flown on a number of missions. |
|
6In this paper the terms "partner," "partnering,"
and "partnership" refer to the mental context of a relationship between
two organizations, not to organizations forming or operating as legal corporate
partnerships. That is, regardless of the contractual arrangements, two organizations
can relate as subcontractors (deliverables well specified in advance, vendor operates
relatively independently of the customer) or as partners (deliverables cannot
be well specified in advance, vendor and customer operate somewhat seamlessly
as a single team or organization). |
| 7Formally,
JPL is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC), operated by
Caltech, a private, not-for-profit educational institution, under contract to
NASA, an agency of the U.S. federal government. |
Article version 1 © 2008 Frontier Associates, Inc. Permission
is granted to reprint and distribute this article provided that the copyright
and source information are included. |